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Julie A. Kmec, Ph.D. 
My dissertation integrates a labor market 
stratification and an organizational demography 
approach to investigate labor market inequalities in 
race and gender. My foremost research concern is to 
investigate inequality in employer allocation of rewards 
to minority and majority group workers and, 
particularly, how the allocation of rewards occurs in 
and is patterned by features of work establishments. A 
secondary concern focuses on the ways in which 
employers systematically sort whites and minorities 
into different jobs, Analyses presented in my 
dissertation are among the first to use establishment-
worker linked data to explore the association between 
race segregation at the job-level and worker outcomes, 
Following a review of methods used to collect 
establishment-worker linked data, the first set of 
empirical analyses tests predictions from three theories 
about the effects of workplace race composition on 
individual wages and job benefits. Ofthe theories I test, 
Blau's (1977) "minority group power theory," and 
Blalock's (1967) "minority group threat theOlY" and 
"devaluation theory" data support devaluation theory. 
Compared to predominantly white jobs, predominantly 
African American and Hispanic jobs pay less and offer 
fewer benefits to all workers, regardless of their race, 
Moreover, I find that the devaluation of work done by 
minorities occurs at the job level as opposed to the 
occupation or establishment levels, 1 A second set of 
analyses investigates the sources of variation in the race 
and gender compositions of an establishment. In brief, 
an employer's race and gender are strong predictors of 
the race and gender composition of establishments, net 
of establishment characteristics and applicant pool 
demographics, A final set of multivariate analyses 
explain the black-white pay gap in urban labor 
markets. These final analyses are grounded in two 
major theoretical frameworks: human capital theory 
and institutional theory. The former attributes race 
differences in pay to individual-level characteristics 
associated with pay, while the latter argues minority 
wage penalties are a function of institutional 
arrangements that operate to their disadvantage, 
Features of workplaces, especially workplace race 
segregation, explain a significantly larger share of the 
black-white wage gap than differences in education, 
experience, seniority, and work hours among racial 
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groups. My dissertation concludes with both policy and 
research suggestions. 
Data Sources and Sample Description 
Data for analyses come from two primary sources: 
the Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality (MCSUI), 
and its companion, the Multi-City Telephone Employer 
Survey (MCTES), The MCSur is a multistage, 
stratified, clustered area-probability sample of adult 
residents in Atlanta, Boston, Detroit, and Los Angeles 
collected between 1992 and 1994, The dataset contains 
information regarding labor market dynamics, racial 
attitudes, residential segregation, and demographic 
characteristics for roughly 9,000 respondents in these 
four metropolitan areas, 
The Multi-City Employer Telephone Survey 
(MCTES) contains demand-side information for a 
sample of 3,510 establishments in Atlanta, Boston, 
Detroit, and Los Angeles, collected as part ofthe Multi-
City Project between June 1992 and May 1994. 
Interviewers identified roughly one-third of the 
employers in the MCTES through household 
respondents in the MCSUI study. As a result, I linked 
the MCSUI and MCTES to create a dataset containing 
information about individuals, their jobs, their 
employers, and their establishments, While some 
analyses draw strictly from the establishment-only data, 
a majority of analyses consider both supply- and 
demand-side factors that contribute to labor market 
inequality, 
Descriptive analyses reveal evidence of job race 
segregation within the four metropolitan areas; roughly 
60 percent of whites work in a job where most of the 
workers are white, while only one-third of African 
American, Hispanic, Asian, and other nonwhite 
workers report working in jobs that are mostly white. 
At the establishment level, similar race segregation is 
evident. The average establishment percent minority is 
significantly higher for African Americans and 
Hispanics (70 percent) than it is for whites (43 percent), 
At the MSA-specific occupation level, workers of all 
races work in predominantly white occupations, but 
occupation-level race segregation is less severe than 
either job or establishment level segregation. What is 
more, I find that occupation-race composition 
estimates mis-state the race of job holders, Workers 
who report having predominantly African American (or 
Hispanic) coworkers have an average metropolitan 
African American occupation percent of only 15 
percent (or 6 percent Hispanic), Workers with mostly 
Asian coworkers have an average Asian occupation 
percent of20 percent. The low correspondence between 
job race-type and MSA occupation to race composition 
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leads me to conclude that jobs in specific 
establishments have much different race compositions 
than MSA-wide occupations that span establishments. 
In summary, even MSA-specific occupation-level 
proxies for job-race composition are inaccurate and 
underestimate the racial diversity ofthe jobs held by a 
population. 
On average, pay and benefit levels are lower among 
African American and Hispanics compared to whites. 
What is more, employers reward workers in 
predominantly minority work settings with lower pay 
and fewer benefits than those working in mostly white 
settings. In this sample, predominantly minority jobs 
are lower-skilled than those held by non-minorities, but 
there is no evidence to suggest that workers in 
predominantly minority settings have overall lower-
than-average human capital than those in mostly white 
settings. The characteristics of establishments 
employing whites, African Americans, Asians, and 
Hispanics partly explain race differences in pay levels. 
In general, compared to white establishments, the 
typical predominantly minority establishment has 
fewer of the "primary market" characteristics 
associated with high pay and rewards. To demonstrate, 
compared to mostly white establishments, occupations 
in mostly minority establishments have, on average, 
lower occupational cognitive skill requirements, lower 
unionization rates, are less likely to have intemallabor 
markets than predominantly white establishments, and 
are smaller. Based on the descriptive evidence in this 
chapter, one might conclude that differences in the 
characteristics of establishments that employ minorities 
and whites, or skill requirements of predominantly 
minority versus predominately white jobs, drive the 
race wage differential. Multivariate analyses illustrate 
that these differences are not the only cause of the wage 
gap or the lower pay for those in mostly minority 
settings. Before summarizing these analyses, however, 
I highlight the second set of descriptive analyses in my 
dissertation. 
Establishment-Worker Linked Data: A Review 
My dissertation includes a review of publicly 
available establishment-worker linked data sets and 
four common methods researchers use to generate these 
data. I include this review because establishment-
worker linked data is necessary to study the 
mechanisms that influence worker outcomes, as well as 
how individuals use workplace context to emphasize or 
minimize the importance of ascriptive characteristics 
for work outcomes. Also, establishment-worker linked 
data is necessary to correctly model workplace 
processes (Baron and Bielby 1980; Nelson and Bridges 
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1999; Reskin 2000). Studying only work 
establishments obscures our understanding of the 
extent to which individual-level attributes affect 
employment outcomes while studying only tlle 
individuals within establishments obscures our 
understanding of the ways in which workplaces 
influence employer and worker decisions. 
I review three methods of matched data generation, 
all of which begin with a random sample of individuals. 
In the first method (what I call the "person-based 
method"), researchers use a random sample of 
individuals to report on characteristics of their place of 
employment. The second method (which I refer to as 
the "mapped archival method") begins with a random 
sample of individuals who report information about 
themselves and the name and location of their 
employing establishment. Researchers attach published 
data about the respondent's establishment to an 
individual's records to generate a matched dataset. The 
third method (which I define as the "multiple step 
method") begins with a random sample of individuals. 
From this sample, researchers generate an 
establishment sample by asking individuals to identify 
their place of employment, then interview an employer 
there. The matched data set results form linking 
information reported by an individual with 
establishment data provided by an employer. 
Of the three methods of establishment-worker 
matched data generation I reviewed, the latter method 
is a relatively attractive method for collecting matched 
data. This method ranks well on representativeness, 
avoids applying a size threshold for inclusion, avoids 
the complicated process of identifying an establishment 
sampling frame, and generates a sample that includes 
informal sector establishments. Using this method, 
researchers do not compromise the accuracy of data on 
establishment attributes because employers report 
organizational characteristics, and they can gather 
information about a greater range of information 
unknown to a worker in the establishment (e.g., hiring 
practices, recruitment techniques, or screening 
methods). This point is significant because a 
comparison of employer and employee responses to 
similar questions regarding the establishment in which 
they work reveals that, even within the same 
workplace, employer and worker reports of 
establishment characteristics-especially establishment 
size-are often very different and weakly correlated. 
Specifically, when I compared the percentage 
difference in reports of establishment size as reported 
by an employer and worker in the same establishment, 
over half of reports were not within 50 percent of each 
other, regardless of establishment sector location 
(public versus private) or multiple-site operation. These 
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findings call into question a reliance on individual 
reports of establishment characteristics and emphasize 
the necessity of matched data for accurate empirical 
tests. I conclude that, whenever possible, researchers 
should rely on the employer reports of establishment-
level attributes and use matched establishment-worker 
data to capture the supply- and demand-side features 
that affect work outcomes. 
Why Does Coworker Race Matter? A Test 
of Three Theories of Workplace 
Race Composition 
The first set of multivariate analyses uses the linked 
establishment-worker sample to investigate how the 
race distribution of workers across jobs affects an 
individual's wages and job benefits. These analyses 
accomplish two things: First, they clarify the level-
job, occupation, or establishment-at which workplace 
racial composition affects an individual's work 
rewards. Second, they test which theory-Blau's 
(1977) minority group power theOlY, Blalock's (1967) 
minority group threat theory or devaluation theory-
best explains the association between workplace race 
composition on the hourly wages and job benefits of 
minorities relative to whites. Analyses find that the 
establishment-specific job, as opposed to the 
occupation or establishment, is the appropriate level at 
which to measure workplace race composition. I 
speculate that job-level measures of minority 
concentration are more suitable than either occupation 
or establishment-level measures for identifying racial 
workplace inequality because individuals work and 
receive wages in a specific job, and they are the most 
proximate to both employer decisions and the 
mechanisms that influence worker outcomes. At the 
same time,job-Ievel measures capture finer distinctions 
of race segregation and minority concentration than 
either occupation-level or establishment-level 
measures. 
Results also suggest that employers do not reward or 
penalize minority workers more than whites because of 
their presence injobs, occupations, or establishments. 
The effect of minority job presence on wages and 
benefits was no different for whites or minorities. In 
other words, I did not find that the greater a minority's 
share of the workplace, the less their reward relative to 
whites (SUppOlt for "minority group threat" theory); nor 
did I find higher relative wages and benefits for 
minorities as their share of the workplace increased 
(support for "minority group power" theory). Instead, 
data support devaluation theory; net of city, individual, 
job, and establishment controls indicate that employers 
pay whites and minorities who work in mostly African 
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American or Hispanic jobs less per hour and provide 
them withfewer job benefits than their counterparts 
who work in mostly white jobs. If jobs are the location 
of inequality producing mechanisms, this has important 
implications for the ways in which we can solve the 
problem of racial wage inequality. It suggests that race 
inequality will persist unless establishments create 
policies or practices that target specific jobs, or unless 
employers open jobs to racial minorities. Moreover, 
analyses in this section suggest that because a job's race 
is salient to the reward process, ignoring it will 
misrepresent our understanding of what influences a 
worker's pay and benefit levels. 
Sources of Establishment Demographic 
Composition: A Strong Case for 
In-Group Preferences 
A second set of multivariate analyses investigates 
the sources of an establishment's demographic 
composition. This chapter advances organizational 
demography literature by empirically linking the 
demographic characteristics of employers in charge of 
hiring with applicant pool demographics and 
establishment characteristics of race and gender 
composition. Earlier analyses demonstrated that 
individual wage and job benefit levels are generally 
lower in settings with a greater propOltion of 
minorities, so understanding what affects the placement 
of racial minorities and women in different 
establishments than whites and men can reduce wage 
and benefit differences across groups. 
Gary Becker's "taste discrimination" theory (1957, 
1971) and Rosabeth M. Kanter's "homosocial 
reproduction" theory (1971) form the theoretical basis 
for this chapter. Becker's taste discrimination theory 
states that some employers have a "taste" for 
discrimination, interpreted as a desire for physical 
distance from certain groups. As such, some employers 
will hire fewer racial minorities and women because of 
their overt, intentional discriminatory preferences. On 
the other hand, Kanter's explanation for why some 
establishments hire more minorities and women than 
others does not come simply from employer's 
intentional behavior. Kanter's work introduced the idea 
that employer discrimination stems from unintentional, 
cognitive choices; an employer's "taste" for 
discrimination can stem from attraction to similar 
others (in-group others). In fact, Kanter introduced the 
idea of "homosocial reproduction," the process 
whereby an employer looks for outward signs of 
demographic similarity among (potential) employees, 
classifies employees on the basis of their similarities 
and differences to him- or herself, and uses these social 
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similarities to make employment-related decisions. 
Employers believe outward similarity signals a basis 
for trust, mutual understanding, and ease of 
communication (Kanter 1977). Both taste 
discrimination and homosocial reproduction theory 
would argue that the race and gender ofthe employer in 
charge of hiring will match the race/sex composition of 
his or her workplace. 
Analyses estimating variation in an establishment's 
African American, Hispanic, and Asian workforce, as 
well as female representation in blue-collar and sales 
occupations, find that employer race and gender ar~ 
strong predictors of an establishment's demographIc 
composition, but suggest support for homosocial 
reproduction because measures of "distaste" were not 
related to outcomes. For example, compared to all 
minority employers, white employers hire more whites 
net of applicant pool race composition, city and 
establishment characteristics, and employer 
discriminatory race preferences (measured as their 
belief about inner-city workers and their willingness to 
hire workers with GEDs, criminal records, or irregular 
employment records-proxies for racial minority 
workers). At the same time, employers also show a 
strong tendency for in-group gender preferences; 
compared to men, women hire significantly more . 
women into blue-collar and sales positions net of CIty 
and establishment characteristics, and discriminatory 
employer sex preferences (e.g., an employer's belief 
that men are better at certain tasks than women). 
These findings have certain implications for race 
and gender labor market inequality. First, because 
racial minorities and women are disproportionately 
underrepresented as employers with hiring power in 
these four metropolitan areas, employer in-group 
preferences disproportionately hurt minorities and 
women. At tlIe same time, employer in-group 
favoritism is considered discrimination, but it does not 
fit the "familiar" explanation for why some 
establishments employ more minorities and women 
then others because it is not overt or even intentional. 
In many cases, this type of discrimination is "invisible" 
and employers may not even realize their actions or. 
behaviors have a tendency exclude out-groups, makmg 
it difficult to target and remedy. 
To conclude, employer in-group preferences affect 
who they hire. Even when an employer uses fonnal 
hiring procedures and rules of operation, and when 
applicant demographics and employer discriminatOlY 
tastes are held constant, employers have a tendency to 
hire in-group race and gender applicants. The main 
implication from these analyses is that stronger checks 
of an employer's discriminatory preferences are 
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necessary to eliminate ascriptive labor market 
inequality. 
Explanations of the Black-White Wage Gap 
in Urban Labor Markets 
A final analytic chapter considers possible 
explanations of the race and gender wage gap in urban 
labor markets. In this sample, African American 
workers eam 24 percent less than whites. Nationwide, 
year-round, and full-time, African Americans eam 
roughly 17 percent of the average wage eamed by a 
white worker (U.S. Bureau of the Census 2001), 
despite the African American community's gains in . 
human capital and the govemment's efforts to equahze 
white and minority workplace opportunities with 
affilmative action (Reskin 1998). Human capital theory 
and institutional theory offer competing explanations 
for this gap. Using establishment-worker matched data 
and regression decomposition, I test these explanations 
of the race eamings gap. I consider the gross 
relationship between race and wages and the net 
relationship of individual-level attributes and three 
groups of structural characteristics: 1) occupation/job 
skill demands; 2) fonnalization and industrial sector; 
and 3) workplace demographic composition. Central to 
my analysis-and what distinguishes it from earlier 
explanations of the black-white wage gap--is the. 
inclusion of a job-level race composition measure m 
wage attainment models. 
I can account for 83 percent of the black-white 
wage gap, and a majority of the gap is explained by 
institutional factors. Human capital theory suggests that 
the attributes one brings to the workplace influence 
wages, and black-white differences in such attribut~s 
drive the race wage gap. African Americans and whItes 
have significantly different levels of human capital, but 
black-white education, seniority, and work hour 
differences account for only 20 percent of the black-
white wage gap. Institutional theory suggests that 
differences in the characteristics of the workplaces 
employing African Americans and whites drive the 
wage gap. To test the utility of this theory in exp~aining 
the gap, I estimated the percent of the black-whIte 
wage gap explained by three types of workplace 
features. Research suggests that black-white 
differences in occupation and job skill demand 
explained just over one-third of the to the racial wage 
gap, and that workplace fonnalization and indust~y 
location explain none of the gap. The demographiC 
composition of workplaces (e.g., occupation percent 
female, job race type, and supervisor race), on the other 
hand, accounted for roughly 30 percent of the black-
white wage gap. In other words, the segregation of 
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blacks and whites into different jobs and occupations 
within establishments is central to explanations of the 
race wage gap. 
Conclusions 
Overall, the analyses in my dissertation have 
demonstrated three crucial results for future studies of 
labor market inequality and policies meant to eliminate 
ascliptive inequality in employment and wages. First, 
analyses locate jobs within specific establishments as 
the place where mechanisms responsible for producing 
racial wage inequality occur; reward levels are lower in 
predominantly minority jobs as compared to jobs held 
mainly by whites, even net of job cognitive skill 
demands and workplace features. Moreover, racial 
minolities suffer disproportionately from lower wages 
because they are more likely than whites to have 
minolity coworkers. Focusing attention on broad, 
aggregate industries or occupations will miss racial 
inequality resulting from processes that occur at the job 
level. Second, regardless of who applies or the presence 
of formal operating and recruiting procedures, 
employers have a tendency to hire in-group members. 
Whether the tendency to hire in-group workers is due to 
out-group animus (taste discrimination), similality 
attraction (homosocial reproduction), or even the 
demographic composition of one's social networks, to 
curb hiling inequalities employers and policymakers 
must implement and enforce procedures that eliminate 
employer discretion during the hiring process. Blind 
hiring procedures, holding employers accountable for 
their hiring decisions, or having a powerful in-house 
agency to check an employer's decision may reduce the 
tendency toward bias in hiling. Finally, analyses in the 
dissertation suggest that the elimination of job-level 
race segregation will have a sizeable impact on race 
wage and employment inequality. The formal 
procedures I noted above are a first step to open jobs to 
all workers, regardless of their race or gender. To 
conclude, research from my dissertation suggests that 
ascriptive inequality exists in urban labor markets but 
that with attention to job-level processes, consideration 
of employers' decision-making processes, and the 
reduction of workplace race segregation, employers 
and policymakers can eliminate wage inequality. 
Note 
1. A "job" is defined as a specific position in a workplace, 
while an "occupation" is a collection of jobs involving 
similar activities across establishments. 
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